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Opening paragraph 20 
The Paris Agreement has opened debate on whether limiting warming to 21 
1.5°C is compatible with current emission pledges and warming of about 22 
0.9°C from the mid-19th-century to the present decade. We show that limiting 23 
cumulative post-2015 CO2 emissions to about 200 GtC would limit post-2015 24 
warming to less than 0.6°C in 66% of Earth System Model members of the 25 
CMIP5 ensemble with no mitigation of other climate drivers, increasing to 26 
240GtC with ambitious non-CO2 mitigation. We combine a simple climate-27 
carbon-cycle model with estimated ranges for key climate system properties 28 
from the IPCC 5th Assessment Report. Assuming emissions peak and decline 29 
to below current levels by 2030 and continue thereafter on a much steeper 30 
decline, historically unprecedented but consistent with a standard ambitious 31 
mitigation scenario (RCP2.6), gives a likely range of peak warming of 1.2-32 
2.0°C above the mid-19th-century. If CO2 emissions are continuously adjusted 33 
over time to limit 2100 warming to 1.5°C, with ambitious non-CO2 mitigation, 34 
net future cumulative CO2 emissions are unlikely to prove less than 250 GtC 35 
and unlikely greater than 540GtC. Hence limiting warming to 1.5°C is not yet a 36 
geophysical impossibility, but likely requires delivery on strengthened pledges 37 
for 2030 followed by challengingly deep and rapid mitigation. Strengthening 38 
near-term emissions reductions would hedge against a high climate response 39 
or subsequent reduction-rates proving economically, technically or politically 40 
unfeasible. 41 
  42 
Main text:  43 
The aim of Paris Agreement is “holding the increase in global average 44 
temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts 45 
to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C”1. The Parties also undertook to 46 
achieve this goal by reducing net emissions “to achieve a balance between 47 
anthropogenic sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the 48 
second half of this century”, and hence implicitly not by geo-engineering 49 
planetary albedo. Under what conditions is this goal geophysically feasible? 50 
 51 
Human-induced warming reached an estimated 0.93°C (±0.13°C; 5-95 52 
percentile range) above mid-19th-century conditions in 2015 and is currently 53 
increasing at almost 0.2°C per decade2. Combined with the effects of El Niño 54 
and other sources of natural variability, total warming exceeded 1°C for the 55 
first time in 2015 and again in 20163. Average temperatures for the 2010s are 56 
currently 0.88°C above 1861-80, which would rise to 0.93°C should they 57 
remain at 2015 levels for the remainder of the decade. With few exceptions4,5, 58 
mitigation pathways that could achieve peak or end-of-century warming of 59 
1.5°C have thus far received little attention. Even the “Paris, increased 60 
ambition” scenario of ref. 6 results in CO2 emissions still well above zero in 61 
2100 and hence a low chance of limiting warming to 1.5°C. 62 
 63 
Long-term anthropogenic warming is determined primarily by cumulative 64 
emissions of CO27–10: the IPCC 5th Assessment Report (IPCC-AR5) found that 65 
cumulative CO2 emissions from 1870 had to remain below 615GtC for total 66 
anthropogenic warming to remain below 1.5°C in more than 66% of members 67 
of the CMIP5 ensemble of Earth System Models (ESMs)11 (see Fig. 1a). 68 
Accounting for the 545GtC that had been emitted by the end of 201412, this 69 
would indicate a remaining budget from 2015 of less than 7 years’ current 70 
emissions, while current commitments under the Nationally Determined 71 
Contributions (NDCs) indicate 2030 emissions close to current levels13.  72 
 73 
The scenarios and simulations on which these carbon budgets were based, 74 
however, were designed to assess futures in absence of CO2 mitigation, not 75 
the very ambitious mitigation scenarios and correspondingly small amounts of 76 
additional warming above present that are here of interest. Furthermore, 77 
many mitigation scenarios begin reductions in 2010 and are already 78 
inconsistent with present-day emissions, complicating the comparison with 79 
pledges for 2030.  80 
 81 
Updating carbon budgets and scenarios for ambitious mitigation goals 82 
The black cross on Fig. 1a shows an estimate of human-induced warming, 83 
which excludes the impact of natural fluctuations such as El Niño, in 2015 84 
(0.93±0.13°C relative to 1861-80; 5-95 percentile range) and pre-2015 85 
cumulative carbon emissions (545±75GtC since 1870; 1 standard deviation). 86 
While both quantities are individually consistent with the CMIP5 ensemble, in 87 
the mean CMIP5 response (coloured lines) cumulative emissions do not 88 
reach 545GtC until after 2020, by which time the CMIP5 ensemble-mean 89 
human-induced warming is over 0.3°C warmer than the central estimate for 90 
human-induced warming to 2015. In estimating the outstanding carbon budget 91 
for 1.5°C, this is an important discrepancy. IPCC-AR5 also calculated the 92 
percentiles of the CMIP5 distribution that exceeded given thresholds of 93 
warming relative to the average of 1986-2005 (Table 12.3 of ref 14), adding a 94 
further 0.61°C to express these relative to 1850-1900. However, this 95 
reference period and the GCM ensemble used in this table are not identical to 96 
the ESM ensemble used to derive estimates of the carbon budget, for which a 97 
volcano-free reference period is preferred, to focus on human-induced 98 
warming. Moreover, since the discrepancy in warming between ESMs and 99 
observations only emerges after 2000, expressing warming relative to the 100 
1986-2005 reference period does not entirely resolve it and also does not 101 
address the small underestimate in cumulative emissions to date. Fig. 1b 102 
shows an alternative analysis of the CMIP5 ensemble to assess the remaining 103 
carbon budget for an additional 0.6°C of warming beyond the current decade, 104 
a possible interpretation of ‘pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase 105 
to 1.5°C’ in light of estimated human-induced warming to date. The median 106 
response of the CMIP5 models indicates allowable future cumulative 107 
emissions (threshold-exceedance budget or TEB15)  of 223GtC for a further 108 
0.6°C warming above the 2010-2019 average, and a 204GtC remaining TEB 109 
from 2015 to keep warming likely below this value (meaning, by the time 110 
cumulative emissions from 2015 reach 204GtC, 66% of CMIP5 models have 111 
warmed less than 0.6°C above the present decade, consistent with the 112 
methodology for assessing the 2°C carbon budget in IPCC-AR516). Given 113 
uncertainty in attributable human-induced warming to date, differences 114 
between observational products and true global surface air temperature17, and 115 
the precise interpretation of the 1.5°C goal in the Paris Agreement (for 116 
example, the choice of pre-industrial reference period which temperatures are 117 
defined relative to18), budgets corresponding to a range of levels of future 118 
warming should also be considered – see Table 1 and the Supplementary 119 
Information.  120 
 121 
TEBs are useful because peak CO2-induced warming is a function (shown by 122 
the grey plume in figure 1) of cumulative CO2 emissions and approximately 123 
independent of emission path, although threshold behaviour, such as sudden 124 
carbon release from thawing permafrost, might complicate this relationship19. 125 
This does not apply to non-CO2 forcing, which is relatively more important for 126 
ambitious mitigation scenarios. The rapid warming from the 2000s to the 127 
2030s in CMIP5 arises partly from strong increases in net non-CO2 forcing 128 
over this period in the driving RCP scenarios, due to simulated rapid 129 
reductions in cooling aerosol forcing. It remains unclear whether this increase 130 
in non-CO2 forcing will be observed if future reductions in aerosol emissions 131 
occur because present-day effective non-CO2 forcing is still highly uncertain20. 132 
Table 2 shows budgets for thresholds of future warming in the CMIP5 133 
ensemble under an RCP2.6 scenario, a stabilisation scenario in which non-134 
CO2 forcing across the rest of the century remains closer to the 2010-2019 135 
average than in the RCP8.5 scenario. This allows more CO2-induced warming 136 
for the same total, increasing the median TEB of the CMIP5 distribution for an 137 
additional 0.6°C to 303GtC and the 66th percentile to 242GtC.  138 
 139 
In many current ambitious mitigation scenarios (e.g. RCP2.621, dark blue lines 140 
in fig. 2), substantial CO2 emission reductions begin in 2010, such that both 141 
emissions and forcing are already inconsistent with observed climate state 142 
and emission inventories to date. The thick dark green lines in Fig. 2 show an 143 
amended version of RCP2.6 that is more consistent with current emissions 144 
and estimated present-day climate forcing. This scenario, hereafter referred to 145 
as RCP2.6-2017, assumes the same proportional rates of change of 146 
emissions of both CO2 and other anthropogenic forcing components as in the 147 
standard RCP2.6 scenario from 2010, but with the mitigation start date 148 
delayed by 7 years to 2017 (following the RCP8.5 scenario22 between 2010-149 
2017). This is more representative of a possible mitigation pathway from 150 
today: many nations are already planning on policy action to reduce 151 
emissions over the 2015-2020 period, in anticipation of achieving their NDC 152 
commitments in the future. Total anthropogenic radiative forcing peaks in 153 
2050 (at 3.41 Wm-2) in RCP2.6-2017, as opposed to in 2043 (at 3.00 Wm-2) 154 
under RCP2.6. The grey lines represent emissions pathways from the IPCC 155 
430-480ppm scenario category23,24 but with proportional decreases in 156 
radiative forcing also delayed by 7 years to start in 2017.  157 
 158 
Figure 2c shows the implications of these scenarios for future warming, 159 
evaluated with a simple climate model that reproduces the response of the 160 
CMIP5 models to radiative forcing under ambitious mitigation scenarios 161 
(Supplementary Material). Like other simple climate models, this lacks an 162 
explicit physical link between oceanic heat and carbon uptake. It allows a 163 
global feedback between temperature and carbon uptake from the 164 
atmosphere, but no direct link with net deforestation. It also treats all forcing 165 
agents equally, in the sense that a single set of climate response parameters 166 
are used in for all forcing components, despite some evidence of component 167 
specific responses25,26. We do not, however, attempt to calibrate the model 168 
directly against observations, using it instead to explore the implications of 169 
ranges of uncertainty in emissions12, and forcing and response derived 170 
directly from the IPCC-AR5, which are derived from multiple lines of evidence 171 
and, importantly, do not depend directly on the anomalously cool 172 
temperatures observed around 2010. Non-CO2 forcing and the transient 173 
climate response (TCR) co-vary within AR5 ranges to consistently reproduce 174 
present-day externally-forced warming (Methods), and as in figure 1b, we 175 
quote uncertainties in future temperatures relative to this level. 176 
 177 
The limits of the green plume in Fig. 2c show peak warming under the 178 
RCP2.6-2017 scenario is likely between 1.24-2.03°C (1.12-1.99°C for 2100 179 
warming) given a 2015 externally-forced warming of 0.92°C. The IPCC-AR5 180 
did not propose a ‘best-estimate’ value of the TCR, but using a central value 181 
of 1.6°C (the median of a log-normal distribution consistent with IPCC-AR5 182 
likely ranges, the typical shape of most reported TCR distributions in ref. 16), 183 
RCP2.6-2017 gives a median peak warming of 1.55°C above pre-industrial 184 
(1861-1880 mean) and 1.47°C in 2100, approximately consistent with as likely 185 
as not (50% probability) of warming below 1.5°C in 2100.  186 
 187 
The shaded green bands show the central four probability sextiles of the 188 
distribution of responses to RCP2.6-2017 for a log-normal distribution for TCR 189 
(see Supplementary Material for alternative distributions). Under RCP2.6-190 
2017, peak warming is likely below 2°C, and well below 2°C by the end of the 191 
century. However, such a scenario cannot exclude a non-negligible probability 192 
of peak warming significantly in excess of 2°C, particularly given the 193 
possibility of non-linear climate feedbacks for which there is some evidence in 194 
more complex GCMs27.  195 
 196 
Emissions in Fig. 2a are diagnosed from radiative forcing in Fig. 2b using a 197 
version of the IPCC-AR5 carbon cycle impulse-response function28, with a 198 
minimal modification to account for the change in the impulse response 199 
between pre-industrial and 21st century conditions due to atmospheric CO2 200 
and temperature-induced feedbacks on carbon uptake, as observed in Earth 201 
System Models29.  This simple model reproduces the response of ESMs to 202 
ambitious mitigation scenarios (Supplementary Information) including, with 203 
best-estimate parameters, near-constant temperatures following a cessation 204 
of CO2 emissions. The temperature response of the UVic Earth System 205 
Climate Model (UVic ESCM)30–32 driven by the diagnosed RCP2.6-2017 206 
emissions scenario and non-CO2 forcing is shown in Fig. 2c (orange line), 207 
which is emulated well by the simple carbon-cycle-climate model with 208 
equivalent climate response parameters (thin green line, see Methods). 209 
Carbon-cycle feedback uncertainties (see Methods) only have limited scope 210 
to influence the allowable emissions under scenarios in which concentrations 211 
and temperatures peak at a relatively low level.  212 
 213 
Since RCP2.6-2017 represents a scenario with ambitious CO2 and non-CO2 214 
mitigation, it currently lies near the lower limit of 2100 anthropogenic forcing 215 
available in the literature4,15, as shown by the grey lines in Figure 2. We have 216 
not assumed any additional non-CO2 mitigation beyond RCP2.6, but 217 
uncertainties in mitigation technologies and demand reduction measures 218 
decades into the future mean that non-CO2 mitigation may yet play a larger 219 
role than indicated here. 220 
 221 
Adaptive mitigation paths and implications for carbon budgets 222 
The Paris Agreement establishes a regime of continuously updated 223 
commitments informed by on-going scientific and policy developments and 224 
the overarching temperature and emission reduction goal. We therefore re-225 
estimate carbon budgets, accounting for the present-day climate state and 226 
current uncertainty in the climate response, and assuming mitigation efforts 227 
are perfectly adapted over time to achieve a warming in 2100 of 1.5°C for a 228 
range of possible realisations of the climate response2,33. Figure 3a shows a 229 
distribution of future temperature trajectories, for different climate responses, 230 
that are all consistent with observed attributable warming in 2015 and a 231 
smooth transition to 1.5°C in 2100. The limits of the green plume show 232 
temperature trajectories associated with IPCC-AR5 likely ranges for TCR and 233 
equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS), with bands delineating the central four 234 
sextiles of the distribution. These temperatures initially follow the responses to 235 
the RCP2.6-2017 scenario (the green plumes in Figure 2c) but are then 236 
smoothly interpolated over the coming century to the trajectory given by the 237 
best-estimate response (see Supplementary Methods). This provides a simple 238 
representation of goal-consistent pathways for a range of possible climate 239 
responses34. In contrast to a scenario-driven, forward-modelling approach 240 
(e.g. ref. 6 and Fig. 2), the temperature trajectories in Figure 3a define the 241 
scenario, from which corresponding CO2 emission pathways (Figure 3b) are 242 
derived, similar to the temperature-tracking approach used by ref 10. This 243 
implicitly assumes that information on the emerging climate response is 244 
available and acted upon instantaneously. In reality, both resolving the 245 
response and adapting policies will be subject to delay, although the impact 246 
can be reduced if policies respond to both observed and decadal predictions 247 
of human-induced warming, which are much better constrained than long-248 
term projections of, for example, ECS.  249 
 250 
Green bands in Fig. 3b show emissions compatible with the goal-consistent 251 
temperature trajectories and climate responses of Figure 3a, computed using 252 
the modified IPCC-AR5 impulse-response function with carbon-cycle 253 
feedback uncertainty assumed positively correlated with TCR (see Methods). 254 
Such an assumption may be pessimistic, but uncertainty in these feedbacks 255 
may also be underestimated in CMIP5 – the impact of thawing permafrost, for 256 
example, is generally not represented. 257 
 258 
Fig. 3c shows cumulative emissions (net carbon budgets) consistent with 259 
limiting warming to 1.5°C warming in 2100 under the climate response 260 
uncertainty distribution and these goal-consistent pathways. The median (‘as 261 
likely as not’) case corresponds to a cumulative budget of 370GtC 262 
(1400GtCO2 - all carbon budgets given to 2 significant figures) from 2015 to 263 
2100, including ~10GtC of net negative emissions in the final decades. 264 
Compared to this, higher cumulative CO2 emissions budgets are associated 265 
with lower climate responses and vice versa (hence the ordering of the 266 
coloured bands in 3a and 3b). Assuming completely successful adaptive CO2 267 
mitigation to achieve a warming of 1.5°C in 2100 (allowing for mid-century 268 
temperature overshoots, assuming non-CO2 forcing following RCP2.6-2017, 269 
and imposing no restrictions on the rate of net carbon dioxide removal), the 270 
cumulative carbon budget from 2015 to 2100 is unlikely (<33% probability) to 271 
be less than 250GtC (920GtCO2), in good agreement with the 242GtC TEB 272 
for the 66th percentile of the CMIP5 distribution for 0.6°C warming above the 273 
2010-2019 average in the RCP2.6 scenario (Table 2). Conversely, cumulative 274 
future emissions from 2015 compatible with a warming of 1.5°C in 2100 are 275 
unlikely to be greater than 540GtC (the top of the 50-67% band in Figure 3c) 276 
even under such an idealised perfectly responsive mitigation policy. The 277 
relationship between CO2-induced future warming compatible with the 278 
cumulative emissions shown in Fig. 3c is also broadly consistent that 279 
expected from the IPCC-AR5 likely range of TCRE (see Fig. S4), which, when 280 
combined with varying contributions from non-CO2 forcing, informs the all-281 
forcing budgets quoted here.  282 
 283 
The small difference that varying TCR makes to warming between 2015 and 284 
2030 (Fig. 3a) highlights both the importance of continuous quantifications of 285 
human-induced warming in any stock-take of progress to climate stabilization, 286 
and the need for a precautionary approach even under an adaptive mitigation 287 
regime34.  Although more progress has been made on constraining TCR than 288 
ECS, uncertainties are unlikely to be resolved rapidly. Allowing emissions to 289 
rise in the hope of a low climate response risks infeasible subsequent 290 
reductions should that hope prove ill founded. Conversely, the risk of “over-291 
ambitious” mitigation is low: the darkest green plume in fig. 3b shows that the 292 
difference between a TCR of 1.3°C and 1°C has a substantial impact on the 293 
allowable carbon budget for 1.5°C, but the probability of a TCR in that range 294 
is already assessed to be low. Since IPCC-AR5 a number of studies have 295 
suggested an increase in the lower bound on TCR towards 1.3°C (e.g ref. 25), 296 
whilst others indirectly support a 1.0°C lower bound through upward revisions 297 
of radiative forcing35,36. Using a TCR likely range of 1.3-2.5°C and an ECS 298 
likely range of 2.0-4.5°C, the remaining budget for a 1.5°C warming would be 299 
unlikely greater than 400GtC and unlikely less than 220GtC (see 300 
Supplementary Information figure S18).  301 
 302 
Discussion and implications for the ‘emissions gap’ 303 
Much recent policy discussion has centred on the ‘emissions gap’ between 304 
the NDCs emerging from the Paris Agreement and emission scenarios 305 
consistent with 1.5°C and 2°C13,37. The extent of any ‘gap’ depends on the 306 
uncertain climate response; the definition of the Paris Agreement goals; the 307 
interpretation, delivery and/or revision of the NDCs, and in particular the 308 
technical and/or socio-economic feasibility of subsequent emissions 309 
reductions.  310 
 311 
Considerable uncertainties are associated with the NDCs themselves13,38. 312 
Modelling indicates that the NDCs could be consistent with global fossil fuel 313 
and land-use change CO2 emissions in 2030 only slightly above 2015 314 
values6,13 (lower limit of the brown bar in Fig. 2a and 3b), close to the RCP2.6-315 
2017 scenario. This would imply that if (i) NDCs are fully implemented 316 
(including all conditional elements), with plausible values for Chinese 317 
emissions in 2030, and (ii) RCP2.6-2017 mitigation rates are maintained after 318 
2030, then the NDCs would still remain inconsistent with future scenarios 319 
projected to correspond to a peak warming likely below 2°C and a 2100 320 
warming as likely as not below 1.5°C. However, a modest strengthening of the 321 
pledges corresponding to an approximate 10% reduction in proposed 2030 322 
emissions could achieve consistency with such scenarios. Hence the NDCs 323 
as they stand do not necessarily imply a commitment to a fundamentally 324 
different approach, such as resorting to solar radiation management (SRM), to 325 
achieve a warming of 1.5°C in 2100, if the climate response is close to or less 326 
than our central estimate and if emissions can be rapidly reduced after 2030. 327 
The RCP2.6-2017 scenario involves a smooth transition to slightly negative 328 
net CO2 emissions after 2080, which may require challenging rates of 329 
deployment of CO2 removal (CDR). Figure 3b shows that returning warming to 330 
1.5°C in 2100 under a higher climate response potentially requires very 331 
substantial rates of CDR, which may not be technically feasible or socio-332 
economically plausible.  333 
   334 
An additional caveat to assessments of a 2030 “emissions gap” is that most 335 
NDCs are formulated in terms of CO2-equivalent (CO2-eq) emissions, a 336 
composite metric of warming impact of different gases based on Global 337 
Warming Potentials (GWPs) from various IPCC reports. It is therefore 338 
impossible to assess precisely the 2030 emissions of CO2 itself that are 339 
compatible with these pledges without additional assumptions, because CO2-340 
eq pledges could be attained through varying combinations of long-lived and 341 
short-lived forcer mitigation39–41. Separate reporting of long-lived and short-342 
lived greenhouse gases in national pledges would help clarify their long-term 343 
implications41,42.  344 
 345 
Aside from scientific uncertainties and the interpretation of the NDCs, a crucial 346 
issue is the feasibility of achieving sufficient rates and levels of 347 
decarbonisation required by these ambitious mitigation scenarios. Rapid 348 
decarbonisation relies on societies being able to swiftly replace existing 349 
capital with new investments at massive scales. Inertia within the economic 350 
system is an important constraint on realisable mitigation pathways43. 351 
RCP2.6-like scenarios imply decarbonisation at over 0.3GtC/yr/yr in the 2030s 352 
and 2040s – or 4-6% per year sustained for multiple decades. If applied to 353 
gross CO2 emissions, such rates of reduction have historically only been 354 
observed globally for short periods, such as in the 1930s Great Recession 355 
and the 2nd World War, and regionally in the collapse of the former Soviet 356 
Union44. Sustained decarbonisation at these rates, and the associated capital 357 
displacement (run-down and replacement of fossil-fuel infrastructure), would 358 
be historically unprecedented, though the parallel between intentional policy-359 
driven decarbonisation in the future and historical rates remains unclear.  360 
 361 
Longer-term deep decarbonisation also relies on many energy system 362 
innovations, including development and deployment on an unprecedented 363 
scale of renewable energy as well as, as yet undemonstrated, amounts of 364 
carbon capture and storage and CDR45. Given possible limits to rates of 365 
decarbonisation, near-term mitigation ambition and delays in mitigation start 366 
dates may strongly influence peak and 2100 warming. The purple dashed 367 
lines in Fig. 2 illustrate this point with a simple scenario in which CO2 368 
emissions reduce linearly (at 0.17GtC/yr/yr, about 0.6GtCO2/yr/yr) from 2020 369 
in order to achieve approximately the same warming as RCP2.6-2017 in 370 
2100. Under this scenario, maximum rates of decarbonisation are much lower 371 
than in RCP2.6-2017, in both absolute and percentage terms, demonstrating 372 
the potential advantage of more ambitious near-term mitigation given the risk 373 
that subsequent RCP2.6-like rates of decarbonisation may be unachievable. 374 
 375 
More ambitious near-term mitigation may be more feasible than previously 376 
thought. The rapid growth of global emissions 2000-2013 was dominated by 377 
increases in Chinese emissions46, driven, at least in part, by unprecedented 378 
levels of debt-fuelled investment in carbon-intensive industries and capital 379 
stock47. Sustaining such expansion is likely to be neither necessary (the 380 
infrastructure is now built) nor feasible (the debt levels are likely to prove 381 
unsustainable)47. For these reasons, the possibility that both Chinese and 382 
global emissions are at or near their peak46,48 and could reduce from 2020, 383 
seems less far-fetched than it did. This could allow for the required 384 
strengthening of the NDCs in the 2020 review towards an RCP2.6-2017 385 
trajectory or beyond, more readily consistent a 1.5°C goal. 386 
 387 
Regular review of commitments is built in to the Paris Agreement. This 388 
stocktake should be extended to relate commitments directly to the long-term 389 
temperature goal. As human-induced warming progresses, the question must 390 
be asked: “Are we on track to reduce net emissions to zero to stabilise climate 391 
well below 2°C as agreed in Paris”? Regular updates of human-induced 392 
warming based on a standard and transparent methodology would allow 393 
countries to adapt commitments to the emerging climate response. Our 394 
analysis suggests that ‘pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 395 
1.5°C’ is not chasing a geophysical impossibility, but likely requires a 396 
significant strengthening of the NDCs at the first opportunity in 2020 in order 397 
to hedge against the risks of a higher-than-expected climate response and/or 398 
economic, technical or political impediments to sustained reductions at 399 
historically unprecedented34 rates after 2030.  400 
 401 
Tables 402 
 Percentiles of CMIP5 models 
Warming above 2010-
2019 average (°C) 
90% 66% 50% 33% 10% 
0.3 80 106 119 142 189 
0.4 107 133 155 172 242 
0.5 137 168 186 209 299 
0.6 164 204 223 250 333 
0.7 199 245 256 289 387 
0.8 231 279 301 333 438 
0.9 274 321 348 376 505 
1.0 306 358 382 421 579 
1.1 332 395 416 464 653 
 403 
Table 1: Future cumulative budgets (GtC) from January 2015 for percentiles 404 
of the distribution of RCP8.5 simulations of CMIP5 models and various levels 405 
of future warming above the modelled 2010-2019 average. Percentiles 406 
correspond to the percentage of CMIP5 models that have greater cumulative 407 
emissions for the given level of warming.  408 
 409 
 Percentiles of CMIP5 models 
Warming above 2010-
2019 average (°C) 
90% 66% 50% 33% 10% 
0.3 89 106 118 133 245 
0.4 106 152 173 193 NA 
0.5 126 191 214 258 NA 
0.6 143 242 303 NA NA 
0.7 170 291 NA NA NA 
0.8 177 372 NA NA NA 
0.9 277 NA NA NA NA 
1.0 468 NA NA NA NA 
1.1 NA NA NA NA NA 
 410 
Table 2: Future cumulative budgets (GtC) from January 2015 for percentiles 411 
of the distribution of RCP2.6 simulations of CMIP5 models and various levels 412 
of future warming above the modelled 2010-2019 average. Percentiles 413 
correspond to the percentage of CMIP5 models that have greater cumulative 414 
emissions for the given level of warming. If an insufficient number of models 415 
warm above a particular threshold to calculate a given percentile of the total 416 
model distribution a value of NA is given.   417 
418 
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Figure Captions 576 
Figure 1: Warming as a function of cumulative CO2 emissions in the CMIP5 577 
ensemble. (a) Cumulative emissions since 1870 and warming relative to the 578 
period 1861-80, adapted from figure 2.3 of ref 11. The red and grey plumes 579 
show the 5-95% range of model response under the RCPs and 1% annual 580 
CO2 increase scenarios respectively. Thick coloured lines show ensemble 581 
mean response to the RCP forcing scenarios. Ellipses show cumulative 582 
emissions and warming in 2100 for different categories of future emissions 583 
scenario. Black cross shows uncertainty in 2015 human-induced warming and 584 
observed cumulative emissions. (b) As for a) but with cumulative emissions 585 
given since January 2015 and warming relative to the period 2010-2019. 586 
Dashed vertical grey lines show the threshold exceedance budgets (TEBs) 587 
below which over 66% of models have warmed less than 1.5°C above 1861-588 
80 in panel (a), and less than 0.6°C above 2010-19 in panel (b). 589 
 590 
Figure 2: Emissions, forcing and temperature response associated with 591 
various mitigation scenarios. Solid lines in panel (b) show total anthropogenic 592 
forcing for RCP8.5 (red), RCP2.6 (dark blue), RCP2.6-2017 (dark green) and 593 
delayed IPCC-WG3 430-480ppm (grey) scenarios. Dotted lines show non-594 
CO2 forcing. Solid lines in panel (a) shows median diagnosed emissions, with 595 
green shading showing the central 4 probability sextiles in the carbon-cycle 596 
feedbacks distribution. The brown bar denotes projected emissions in 2030 597 
based on current NDCs. Solid lines in panel (c) show median temperature 598 
response, with green shading showing central 4 probability sextiles of 599 
response to RCP2.6-2017 radiative forcing. Black bar shows the likely range 600 
for the IPCC-AR5 scenario-independent projection for the average of the 601 
2016-2035 period49, while black dots represent HadCRUT4 observations 602 
(relative to right hand axis only). The response of the UVic ESCM (orange), 603 
and the simple climate model with identical climate response parameters (thin 604 
green), both driven by the diagnosed RCP2.6-2017 emissions scenario are 605 
shown in panel (c). These two lines correspond to the left hand axis only. 606 
Purple dashed lines in all panels show a hypothetical scenario with linear 607 
emissions decline from 2020 giving similar median warming in 2100 to 608 
RCP2.6-2017.  609 
 610 
 611 
Figure 3: Temperature trajectories and associated emissions consistent with 612 
1.5°C warming in 2100 for a range of climate responses under an adaptive 613 
mitigation regime. Dark green line in panel (a) shows median response to 614 
RCP2.8-2017 scenario as in Fig. 2c, green plume shows temperature 615 
trajectories corresponding initially to central 4 sextiles of the response to 616 
RCP2.6-2017, then smoothly interpolated over 2017-2117 to the median 617 
response. The orange line shows the response of the UVic ESCM driven by 618 
diagnosed emissions from the simple climate-carbon-cycle model consistent 619 
with the interpolated temperature trajectory corresponding to the UVic ESCM 620 
climate response parameters. The thin green line shows the response of the 621 
simple climate-carbon-cycle model driven by the same emissions as the UVic 622 
ESCM with identical climate response parameters to UVic ESCM and 623 
identical carbon-cycle parameters to the standard RCP2.6-2017 scenario in 624 
Fig 1a. These two lines correspond to the left hand axis only. Panel (b) shows 625 
diagnosed emissions consistent with temperature trajectories in panel (a) and 626 
the corresponding response percentile. Brown and black bars shows INDC 627 
emission range and near-term temperature projection as in Fig. 2. Panel (c) 628 
shows cumulative emissions from 2015, or relative to 1870 (right hand axis) 629 






We refer to “climate response” as a specified combination of TCR and ECS 636 
throughout this paper. Our median estimate climate response (TCR=1.6°C, 637 
ECS=2.6°C) is defined as the median of log-normal distributions consistent 638 
with IPCC-AR5 likely bounds on TCR and ECS (TCR: 1.0-2.5°C; ECS: 1.5-639 
4.5°C). From this the likely above/below values are found from the 33rd and 640 
66th percentiles of the distribution (TCR: 1.3-1.9°C; ECS: 2.0-3.3°C ). The 641 
median TCR of this log-normal distribution is significantly lower than in the 642 
IPCC-AR5 ESM ensemble but is more consistent with observed warming to 643 
date than many ensemble members (see Supplementary Methods), indicative 644 
of the multiple lines of evidence used to derive the IPCC-AR5 uncertainty 645 
ranges. Although IPCC-AR5 did not explicitly support a specific distribution, 646 
there is some theoretical justification50 for a log-normal distribution for a 647 
scaling parameter like TCR. Reconciling IPCC-AR5 best-estimate of 648 
attributable warming trend over 1951-2010 with the best-estimate effective 649 
radiative forcing requires a best-estimate TCR near to 1.6°C under the simple 650 
climate model used here, consistent with a log-normal distribution. As a 651 
sensitivity study, we also assume a Gaussian distribution for TCR (see 652 
Supplementary Methods) that raises the 2015 attributable warming to 1.0°C 653 
but only marginally affects the remaining carbon budget for a 1.5°C warming 654 
above pre-industrial (the likely below budget is reduced to 240GtC).  655 
 656 
The ECS distribution used here is derived directly from the IPCC-AR5 likely 657 
bounds that drew on multiple lines of evidence, so our conclusions are not 658 
directly affected by uncertainties in the efficacy of ocean heat uptake that 659 
affect purely observational constraints on ECS51. We are not here arguing for 660 
the revision of uncertainty estimates on any climate response parameters, 661 
although any such revision would of course affect our conclusions. The 662 
implications of an increased lower bound on the climate response are shown 663 
in figure S18. 664 
 665 
Reproducing present day temperatures with differing values for both TCR and 666 
ECS requires these parameters to co-vary with present-day net anthropogenic 667 
radiative forcing52. In the best-estimate forcing case (Figure 2b), past and 668 
future effective radiative forcing components are individually scaled 669 
(multiplicatively) to match the respective best-estimate values for each 670 
component in 2011 as given in IPCC-AR525. Figures 2 and 3 scale past and 671 
future anthropogenic aerosol effective radiative forcing (the most uncertain 672 
forcing component28), along with accounting for combined uncertainty in the 673 
non-CO2 effective radiative forcing components that were assessed to have 674 
Gaussian distributed uncertainty in IPCC-AR5 (draws from this distribution are 675 
taken at a percentile equal to the TCR distribution draw). The aerosol 676 
radiative forcing scaling factor is chosen to give externally-forced warming 677 
above 1861-1880 equal to that under the median climate response (i.e. 678 
0.92°C in 2015) for all draws from the climate response distribution. In all 679 
cases shown the scaled 2011 aerosol forcing is within IPCC-AR5 assessed 680 
uncertainty bounds. A summary of climate system properties used is given in 681 
Table S1: in only one case (the TCRE value implied by the lowest, 17th, 682 
percentile) are these outside the AR5 “likely” ranges, and this parameter 683 
combination is only used in the figures, not our headline conclusions.  684 
 685 
Temperature anomalies are computed using a two-timescale impulse-686 
response model from ref. 29 and 28, in which surface temperatures adjust to an 687 
imposed radiative forcing with a fast and slow timescale characterising the 688 
uptake of heat into the upper and deep ocean (set at 8.4 and 409.5 years 689 
respectively as in ref. 28). The lower limit of the TCR likely range requires a 690 
total anthropogenic forcing of 3.54Wm-2 in 2011, slightly greater than the 691 
upper bound of the IPCC-AR5 confidence interval (3.33 Wm-2). Natural forcing 692 
is taken as given at http://www.pik-potsdam.de/~mmalte/rcps/ and is 693 
smoothed with a 10-year standard deviation Gaussian filter beyond 2015 in all 694 
scenarios.  695 
 696 
In constructing temperature trajectories in Figure 3a, a smooth cosine 697 
interpolation of the CO2-induced warming is applied over the period 2017 to 698 
2117 between the response for a specific climate response parameter set to 699 
RCP2.6-2017 and the total warming under the RCP2.6-2017 median climate 700 
response (which meets the goal of 1.5°C in 2100). Non-CO2 warming remains 701 
as originally simulated under the climate response parameter set for RCP2.6-702 
2017 and only CO2-induced warming is adapted to force the total warming to 703 
asymptote towards the median response of RCP2.6-2017, corresponding to a 704 
scenario in which only CO2 policy responds to the emerging signal.  705 
 706 
CO2 emissions in Figure 2a and 3b are derived using the simple carbon-cycle 707 
impulse-response formulation in ref. 28, modified to make airborne fraction a 708 
linear function of both warming and cumulative carbon uptake by terrestrial 709 
and ocean sinks29. Emissions in all figures are smoothed with a Gaussian 710 
filter with a standard deviation of 2 years: note that our use of an acausal filter 711 
implies that emissions are continuously adjusted to projected human-induced 712 
warming over this timescale in addition to warming to date. Cumulative 713 
emissions (Figure 3c) are more robust than emission rates in any given year, 714 
since rates depend on the method used to construct these goal-consistent 715 
pathways. 716 
 717 
The strength of carbon cycle feedbacks (a single scaling factor applied to 718 
default 𝑟𝑇 and 𝑟𝐶 coefficients in ref. 
29) varies from 0-2, consistent with CMIP5 719 
RCP2.6 ensemble (Sup. Info.). We assume that this scaling factor range 720 
corresponds to the 5-95 percentiles of a Gaussian distribution. In Figure 3, 721 
draws from this carbon-cycle feedback scaling factor distribution are taken at 722 
an equal percentile to that from the TCR distribution. This correlation between 723 
the TCR and carbon-cycle feedback distribution is chosen to maximise the 724 
range of carbon budgets calculated from Figure 3. For each carbon-cycle 725 
feedback strength, total airborne fraction is adjusted (via the 𝑟0 parameter in 726 
ref. 29) to reproduce observed CO2 emissions in 2014 and leads to a range of 727 
historical cumulative CO2 emissions of 467-598GtC (17th-83rd percentile of 728 
distribution), with a median estimate of 542GtC, under carbon-cycle only 729 
uncertainty.   730 
 731 
Figures 2c and 3a show a version of the simple carbon-cycle-climate model 732 
(thin green lines) with thermal climate response parameters as represented in 733 
the UVic Earth System Climate Model (version 2.9 - TCR=1.9°C and 734 
ECS=3.5°C)31,32 and default carbon-cycle parameters given in ref. 29. These 735 
parameters achieve a good emulation of the UVic ESCM response when 736 
driven with the RCP4.5 scenario (see Supplementary Methods). In Figure 2c, 737 
UVic ESCM and the UVic ESCM-emulation simple carbon-cycle-climate 738 
model version are driven by RCP2.6-2017 emissions, diagnosed from the 739 
simple climate-carbon-cycle model using the median climate response and 740 
carbon-cycle parameters (dark green line in Figure 2a) and RCP2.6-2017 741 
non-CO2 radiative forcing scaled as discussed previously, for a 1.9°C TCR. In 742 
Figure 3a, UVic ESCM and the UVic ESCM-emulation simple carbon-cycle-743 
climate model version are driven by diagnosed emissions corresponding to an 744 
interpolated temperature pathway at a 1.9°C TCR, consistent with the method 745 
described previously.    746 
 747 
We add an estimate of the 2030 land-use emissions in RCP2.6-2017 (2023 in 748 
RCP2.6) as derived from the MAGICC model53 (http://www.pik-749 
potsdam.de/~mmalte/rcps/), to the fossil fuel and industry emissions 750 
consistent with the NDCs from ref 12 for the brown bars in Figures 2 and 3.   751 
 752 
In analysis of the CMIP5 ensemble budgets given in Table 1 and 2, budgets 753 
are calculated in an identical fashion to ref. 54 (both in terms of models and 754 
initial condition ensemble members used). Budgets are TEBs and are derived 755 
from percentiles of the distribution of decadal means of CMIP5 RCP8.5 756 
integrations, linearly interpolating between adjacent rank-ordered ensemble 757 
members. In Table 2, where insufficient models cross a particular future 758 
warming threshold to calculate a particular percentile of the total model 759 
distribution at that threshold, no value is reported. For the grey (1%/yr CO2 760 
increase) plume in Figure 1, cumulative emissions and temperatures 761 
expressed from the beginning of the increase (1a) and relative to a ten-year 762 
period centred around the year in which concentrations reach the 2015 value 763 
of 398ppm (1b). Scenarios that peak and decline emissions were excluded 764 
from the red plume in Figure 1b. 765 
Code availability: Code will be available on request to the corresponding 766 
author. 767 
Data availability: RCP forcing data used in this study is available at 768 
http://www.pik-potsdam.de/~mmalte/rcps/   769 
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